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The central arguments within Lenneberg’s thesis of a biological basis for language
are the species-specific nature of the physiological and neurological structures that
make language possible, the cross-species uniformity of language development
(the fact of its acquisition as well as its developmental path, irrespective of culture,
race, etc.; excepting cases of pathology), and the transformational nature of syn-
tax. Transformational syntax forms an important piece of support for Lenneberg’s
discontinuity theory of the evolution of language, meaning that human language
has not descended directly from communication systems found in non-human an-
imals (i.e., our shared ancestors). This is because transformational syntax is also
species-specific, i.e. not found in the communication systems of other animals.
Transformational syntax allows us to convey complex and abstract meanings,
rather than being limited to the here-and-now (e.g. alarm calls) or to simple seman-
tic relations, and it enables us to transform our expressions through syntactic dis-
placement, or movement. In this short paper I will address some questions about
how human children come to acquire the meanings of semantically abstract predi-
cates, how they figure out which strings of words are generated by displacing op-
erations, and the sense in which the tools that allow children to acquire both these
things are innate. The inspiration for this research can be traced to some of the
central themes in Lenneberg’s important work.
2. Displacement
The examples Lenneberg drew on to illustrate the transformational nature of hu-
man language syntax involved syntactic ambiguity: the surface form They are boring
students is compatible with two underlying structures, neither of which is given os-
tensively to the child learner. Such types of sentences present an interesting puzzle
and a demonstration of the necessity for learners to determine the underlying struc-
ture of a sentence which may not be straightforward to determine from its surface
properties. Another example of this puzzle, and one that intersects with the puzzle
of children’s word learning (in particular, predicate learning), concerns what Lees
called “multiply ambiguous adjectival constructions,” such as John is tough to please
(Lees 1960). It is not that the sentence itself is structurally ambiguous, but rather it
has a “constructional homonym” (Chomsky 1964) in surface-similar sentences like
John is eager to please. Thus, while not ambiguous in the adult grammar, the string
of words cannot be mapped unambiguously onto its underlying structure without
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prior knowledge of what the main predicate means. In the case of children, how-
ever, we can’t assume that the lexical meaning of such abstract predicates is known
a priori.
Within movement-based approaches to syntax, such as Government–Binding
Theory or Minimalism, phrases are generated in one position, as determined by
their argument structure relations, and then they can move to a different position
in the sentence (driven and constrained by structural requirements) where they are
pronounced on the surface. When NPs are displaced like this there is a difference
between where the phrase is spoken and where it is interpreted. In order to repre-
sent these sentences correctly, children have to figure out where the displaced NP
is interpreted.
I will limit the discussion here mostly to raising (1) and tough-constructions
(2).
(1) Donaldi seems [ti to be lying]
(2) Melaniai is tough [PROi to please t]
The well-known structure in (1) presents a case in which the matrix subject
Donald has raised into the subject position of the main clause from the subject po-
sition of the embedded clause. Thus, although Donald is local to seem on the sur-
face, its selecting predicate (the predicate it is semantically related to) is the non-
local predicate be lying. Tough-constructions have evaded a clear syntactic analysis
within the GB and Minimalist frameworks (Chomsky 1977, Lasnik & Uriagereka
1994; but see Hicks 2009 for one recent Minimalist account), but they likewise in-
volve a structure in which the matrix subject is not interpreted in its surface posi-
tion. Instead, it is interpreted as the object of the embedded verb (in this case, the
theme of please). Thus, in both of these constructions the subject of the main clause
is not an argument of the (surface-local) matrix predicate (seem or be tough).
The question for acquisition, then, is how learners figure out the underlying
structure and interpretation of these sentences. A possible answer comes from the
Semantic and Syntactic Bootstrapping hypotheses, two accounts of how children
use inductive biases about language structure in order to “bootstrap” themselves
into the grammar. In a nutshell, Semantic Bootstrapping is the idea that since there
is a regular and (mostly) reliable mapping between semantics and the syntactic
category or function of constituents (nouns often label objects (DP in VP), verbs
(vP/VP) often label events and states, subjects (DP in vP) are often agents), children
could use the expectation of this mapping to figure out some basic aspects of syntax,
such as word order (Grimshaw 1981, Pinker 1982). If you hear the sentence The dog
is chasing the cat while viewing a scene in which a dog is chasing a cat, and if you
know which objects the nouns dog and cat map onto and that the agent (the chaser)
should be the syntactic subject, and if you can infer that chase means something like
“pursue,” then you could determine that your language has Subject-Verb-Object
(SVO) word order. In this way, the child uses expectations about semantic patterns
to bootstrap into syntax. The expectations themselves are taken to be innate (not
learned from experience) and specific to language (that is, domain specific).
Evidence for the bias to map animate or agentive NPs to the most prominent
syntactic position comes not only from psycholinguistic studies with children and
adults (Clark & Begun 1971, Trueswell & Tanenhaus 1994, Mak et al. 2002, Traxler
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et al. 2005, Becker 2005, Becker & Estigarribia 2013), but also from argument hi-
erarchies in language that are based on broad typological patterns. Well-known
hierarchies such as the Animacy Hierarchy (Silverstein 1976, Dixon 1979) and the
Thematic Hierarchy (Jackendoff 1972), as well as the Promotion to Subject Hier-
archy (Keenan 1976) show how widespread the preference is in human language
to associate animacy and agency with syntactic prominence, and inanimacy with
lower positions. While this does not in itself necessitate an appeal to innateness,
many linguists believe that typological universals are good candidates for innate
components of language. Furthermore, there is recent neurolinguistic evidence
for anatomically distinct cortical areas for representing agents and patients in sen-
tences (Frankland & Greene 2015). Once again, by itself this does not necessarily
point to innate knowledge of agents vs. patients, but combined with typological
universals and psycholingusitic evidence, it is strongly suggestive of a biological
basis or predisposition for this knowledge—as Lenneberg already recognized (see
Piattelli-Palmarini, this issue for discussion).
There is wide support for the biases underlying Semantic Bootstrapping aid-
ing early parsing of what Keenan (1976) called “basic sentences.” One problem
in applying this type of approach to sentences like (2) and (1), however, is that,
as mentioned above, these sentences have “constructional homonyms,” surface-
similar sentences that are generated by very different underlying structures. They
are exemplified in (3) and (4), respectively.
(3) Donaldi claims [PROi to be tremendous]
(4) Melaniai is eager [PROi to please e]
Thus, these constructions provide another example of the challenge Lenneberg
alluded to with structurally ambiguous sentences. Prior to knowing what claim or
seem means, the sentence is structurally ambiguous. A second shortcoming of Se-
mantic Bootstrapping is that this procedure depends upon learners’ ability to infer
the meanings of individual words from observing what is going on in the world
when words are uttered. Rarely are individual words used to label events or prop-
erties in isolation, outside of the context of a sentence. Thus, while it may be reason-
ble to assume that children could figure out the meanings of some concrete nouns
(dog, cat) from observing the world, most words, verbs in particular, are not learned
that way (parents might say “Look at the dog!” but probably not “Look at chasing!”).
If this criticism holds with verbs like chase, consider how much more problematic
it would be to have to figure out the meaning of seem based on observation of the
world.
Gleitman (1990) proposed a solution that exploited the predictable relation-
ships between the argument structure frames a verb may participate in (that is, the
number and category of “arguments,” or phrases a verb selects as the participants
in the verb’s event) and the semantics of that verb. Her idea was that if children
anticipated such relationships, they could use argument structure to bootstrap into
verb meanings. Argument structure frames do not tell you exactly what an indi-
vidual verb means (certainly, transitive sentence frames admit thousands of verb
meanings), but they can help discriminate verbs that denote an individual action
or change of state (1 argument; 5a) from verbs of contact or causation (2 arguments;
5b) from verbs of transfer (3 arguments; 5c; Landau & Gleitman 1985, Gleitman
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1990). Crucially, this procedure works particularly well for certain verbs that de-
note unobservable states such as mental states and beliefs, like (5d; Gleitman et al.
2005.
(5) a. Jeff slept.
(1 NP argument: intransitive, individual action/change of state)
b. Jim hugged Melissa. (2 NP arguments: transitive; contact, causation)
c. Tommie offered [his constituents] [options]
(3 arguments: ditransitive; transfer)
d. Theresa regrets [that she called for an election]
(NP subject and clausal complement; mental verb)
According to this procedure, known as Syntactic Bootstrapping, learners use
expectations about syntax to map whole sentences onto events in the world and
thereby bootstrap into verb meanings. While Semantic and Syntactic Bootstrap-
ping aim to explain different aspects of how children learn syntax and argument
structure, they both rely on the fact that argument structure relations must be dis-
cernable from the surface forms of sentences; that is, they are surface-local. More
must be said, however, when thematic relations among words in a sentence span
long distances. What happens when the noun next to a verb is not the verb’s argu-
ment? Precisely this situation arises in raising and tough-constructions.
In brief, both Semantic and Syntactic Bootstrapping employ inductive bias to
help children determine the syntactic and semantic properties of “basic sentences.”
But both approaches fall short when we consider displacing constructions, which
illustrate one of the core properties of human language and present a similar puzzle
to what Lenneberg cited as evidence for the transformational nature of syntax. The
solution to how children figure out these constructions will rest on a number of
innate biases.
3. Toward a Solution
3.1. Inanimate Subjects as Cues to Structure
We just saw that both Semantic and Syntactic Bootstrapping rely on inductive bi-
ases to associate certain semantic roles with certain syntactic roles or grammatical
categories, and to associate certain argument structure patterns with certain subcat-
egories of predicate meanings. Both the semantic roles and the argument structure
relations are projected locally and, in the canonical case, computed locally. These
biases are taken to be innate in the sense that they are specific to language (which in
turn is species-specific), and apply cross-linguistically (and thus species-wide; see
Lee & Naigles 2008 for cross-linguistic evidence).
With these biases in place, the learner could identify sentences that break with
the canonical pattern if there is some feature of these non-canonical sentences that
could serve as a trigger. In my previous work I have argued that hearing an inani-
mate subject in sentences like (1) and (2) can provide such a trigger by signaling that
the subject and main predicate are not thematically related (i.e. not in an argument
structure relationship), and therefore that the subject is displaced from elsewhere in
the sentence (Becker 2005, 2006, 2009, 2014, 2015, Mitchener & Becker 2011, Becker
Biolinguistics F Briefs F 385
& Estigarribia 2013). Inanimate subjects provide a helpful clue because inanimate
NPs cannot be agents or experiencers and therefore can’t be the subject argument
of a control predicate (the ones found in (3) and (4)). All languages which contain
both raising and tough constructions, to my knowledge, allow inanimate NPs as
subjects of raising and tough predicates and disallow inanimate NPs as subjects of
control predicates (various Indo-European languages, plus Tongan, Samoan, Ni-
uean, Chamorro and Maori for raising, and Finnish, Mandarin, Labrador Inuttut,
Niuean and Bahasa Indonesian for tough constructions). Moreover, inanimate sub-
jects are more generally restricted: there are a number of languages that simply ban
inanimate subjects in monoclausal transitive contexts (Japanese, Jacaltec, Navajo,
Tlapanec, Blackfoot), and in languages that allow inanimate subjects in such con-
texts there are restrictions on their distribution that do not apply to animate subjects
(Chung 1983, Comrie 1989, Dahl & Fraurud 1996).
In short, inanimate subjects are well tolerated as NPs that have undergone the
kind of displacement in raising and tough-movement, but not as well tolerated as
NPs that are underlyingly generated as external arguments—that is, as underlying
subjects.1
In terms of the learning procedure, if children are biased to expect sentence
subjects to be agents of the main predicate, and if they further assume that inani-
mate things cannot be agents (supported by both research on conceptual develop-
ment, e.g., Woodward et al. 1993, Poulin-Dubois et al. 1996, and linguistic devel-
opment, e.g., Corrigan 1988, Scott & Fisher 2009), then an inanimate NP in subject
position should indicate that there is something out of the ordinary going on with
the sentence. It is either a syntactic object, implying an alternative word order in
just these sentences, or it is a displaced subject. My contention is that learners take
it to be a displaced subject. In my experimental work with adults and children, I
have found that by manipulating the animacy of subjects of sentences with infini-
tive complements we can see asymmetries in how people parse these sentences:
an animate subject tends to lead people to interpret the subject as an argument of
the main predicate, as it would be in a control structure, and an inanimate subject
tends to lead people to interpret the subject as being an argument only of the lower
predicate, as it would be in a raising or tough construction.
It is important to note that tough- and raising constructions have been argued
to be acquired relatively late in development. Chomsky (1969), Cromer (1970) and,
more recently, Anderson (2005) have shown that children go through a long stage of
misinterpreting the subject of a tough-construction as coreferent with the subject of
the embedded clause rather than the object (i.e., they take the matrix subject to refer
to the “pleaser” in (4)—note that this doesn’t mean children cannot interpret the
subject as displaced, rather they haven’t figured out exactly where it is displaced
from); Hirsch & Wexler (2007), Orfitelli (2012) and others have argued that certain
types of raising constructions are acquired late in development, as late as age 7.
1 There is an interesting question about what this would mean for languages that are considered
topic-prominent, meaning that they contain topics instead of subjects. As discussed in Becker
(2014:p. 290ff), although topics, unlike subjects, are not selected by predicates, and therefore
are not as much semantically limited as true subjects are, there are nevertheless strong ten-
dencies both for topics to be associated with agenthood (Li & Thompson 1976, Givo´n 1976,
Schachter 1976) and for topic-prominent languages to also admit subjects when no topic is
available, e.g. in Lisu (Li & Thompson 1976).
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Although my own empirical work has shown that children may comprehend these
structures as early as age 4 it is clear that their knowledge of them is not fully
adult-like until later. The relatively late acquisition of these constructions is not in
itself problematic for a biological account of language acquisition. Lenneberg notes
that the gradual development of language along a specific trajectory is in fact to
be expected on the view that it is biologically based; biological structures typically
mature along a developmental timeline.
3.2. Other Displacing Constructions
I’ve focused here on inanimate subjects as a cue to raising and tough-constructions,
but there are other constructions involving displacement, as well as other cues to
displacement.2 I’ll touch on some of these constructions briefly.
There are several other types of A(rgument)-movement, the type of displace-
ment I’ve discussed above, such as passivization, Raising-to-Object, and subject
raising with unaccusative verbs (intransitive verbs whose sole argument is inter-
nal, rather than external, e.g. fall, arrive).3 There is some evidence that inanimate
subjects can serve as a cue to distinguishing these subcategories of verbs as well.
In adult grammar unaccusative verbs (fall, arrive) freely permit inanimate subjects
(see 6), while unergative verbs (laugh, jump) typically require animate subjects (see
7).
(6) a. The treei fell ti.
b. The packagei arrived ti.
(7) a. # The tree laughed.
b. # The package jumped.
There is room for debate about how strictly unergative verbs require an an-
imate subject; Folli & Harley (2008) in fact argue that the relevant feature here is
not animacy or agency, but “teleological capability,” and that this accounts for the
fact that (8a) is well-formed (since trains are capable of emitting a whistling sound)
but (8b) is not, unless you add the directional PP into the room, since bullets are not
capable of sound emission except through their movement.
(8) a. The train whistled.
b. The bullet whistled *(into the room).
There are some other cases in which unergative verbs allow inanimate sub-
jects (e.g. The machine ran for hours). Nevertheless, when we look at the distribution
of unaccusative and unergative verbs with respect to subject animacy, we see a
striking asymmetry: while children produce unergative verbs almost exclusively
2 Space limitations prevent taking up the issue of expletive subjects, which serve as another
cue to learners that a given predicate is a raising or tough type of predicate (e.g. It’s tough to
please John vs. *It’s eager to please John). Expletives undoubtedly serve as an important cue to a
predicate’s selectional properties in languages that have them.
3 I am putting aside constructions involving what is known as A-bar movement (e.g. wh-
movement, scrambling, topicalization), which does not move a phrase into a canonical ar-
gument position.
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with animate subjects (over 93 %), they produce unaccusative verbs with both ani-
mate and inanimate subjects in roughly equal proportions (Becker & Schaeffer 2013,
Becker 2014). A similar asymmetry is found in parental speech to children (Becker
2014). In addition, experimental work has shown that children interpret an inan-
imate subject of an intransitive verb as a patient (and the verb as an unaccusative
verb), but they interpret an animate subject as an agent (and the verb as unergative;
Bunger & Lidz 2008, Scott & Fisher 2009).
The passive construction, like unaccusatives, involves displacement of a verb’s
internal argument to the subject position on the surface. Like unaccusatives and
the other displacing constructions discussed, passives are quite compatible with
inanimate subjects. Languages that disallow inanimate subjects of active transitive
verbs (noted above, e.g., Japanese, Navajo) freely allow inanimate subjects under
passivization. Thus, inanimate subjects could in theory be used as a cue for acquir-
ing, or at least identifying passive constructions. Unfortunately, it is not so clear
that inanimate subjects are used by children as cues to passives. To give just one
example, Lempert (1989) trained children who were not yet producing passives
spontaneously to imitate passive sentences that had either animate or inanimate
patients. She then tested these children a few days later to see how many passives
they would produce on their own in a picture description task. Lempert found
that children who had been trained on sentences with animate patients produced
the most passives, while children trained with inanimate patients produced more
active sentences.
An important consideration about passives is that the lexical meaning of a
verb does not change according to whether it is used with passive or active voice
(X ate the sandwich and The sandwich was eaten both denote a sandwich-eating event),
but the subcategories of predicates that participate in either raising vs. control,
tough vs. control or unaccusative vs. unergative structures have very different kinds
of lexical meanings. Table 1 shows a partial list of the meanings of raising and
control predicates found in various languages that contain these constructions.
Perlmutter (1978) defined unergative verbs as “predicates describing willed
or volitional acts” and unaccusative verbs as denoting “non-voluntary emission of
stimuli that impinge on the senses” as well as verbs denoting aspectual and in-
Language Raising meanings Control meanings
Chamorro begin, stop be afraid
English
seem, appear, turn-out, tend,
used-to, gonna
want, try, decide, claim
German seem, used-to, must try, forget, forbid
Italian seem, turn-out try, claim, pretend
Maori not, don’t
want, decide, go, be able, agree,
prepare
Niuean be possible, begin, not, usual, almost, nearly try, want, choose
Samoan
be able, be necessary, begin, be
(done) thus
want, try, encourage, go, think,
be tired of, (dis)like
Tongan be able, be possible go, come, stand up, turn, hit
Table 1: A partial list of raising and control predicate meanings in different languages (in alphabet-
ical order top to bottom).
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choative properties of events. In languages that have tough-adjectives (e.g. English,
Finnish, Mandarin, Labrador Inuttut, Niuean and Bahasa Indonesian) the lexical
meanings of these predicates display a remarkably tight range of meanings exclu-
sively revolving around ease and difficulty. If an inanimate subject serves as a cue
not only for identifying a displaced subject but also for narrowing down the lexi-
cal meaning of the predicate in these constructions, then the claim about inanimate
subjects should not in fact extend to the case of passives. Space limitations prevent
a more thorough exploration of this issue.
3.3. Animacy
The ability to use cues from animacy in the service of decoding syntax, whether
for canonical or non-canonical structures, depends upon young children’s ability to
distinguish conceptually between animate and inanimate entities, and to know that
animate entities can be agents while inanimate entities cannot. There is a wealth of
research on cognitive development showing children’s very early ability to make
these distinctions (Spelke 1991, Woodward et al. 1993, Poulin-Dubois et al. 1996,
Woodward 1998). Much of this research reports infants’ and toddlers’ ability to
distinguish between inanimate objects and humans, but there is strong evidence
that preschoolers reason quite differently about the internal properties and poten-
tialities of inanimate objects and non-human animals as well (Carey 1985, Massey
& Gelman 1988, Keil 1989, Rakison & Poulin-Dubois 2001), and that they have a so-
phisticated understanding of the propensity for animals, but not inanimate objects,
to have agentive properties (contrary to the common wisdom, due to Piaget, that
children are “animistic” in their beliefs). Thus, there is good evidence that young
children have reliable knowledge of the animate–inanimate distinction that is not
limited to human vs. inanimate entities.
Could knowledge of the animate–inanimate distinction be innate? It is diffi-
cult to answer this question, but I’ll offer some ways to think about how to approach
it. First, there is evidence that from the earliest moments of life, infants attend to
human faces but not to rearranged components of a human face (Johnson et al.
1991). This suggests a hard-wired ability to distinguish humans via a salient and
prototypically animate property. Cognitive systems for recognizing faces vs. ob-
jects are functionally and anatomically distinct (Farah 1995), as are the systems for
recognizing animate vs. inanimate objects (Warrington & Shallice 1984), suggesting
a differentiation of these categories on a neurological level. The way people reason
about animals vs. objects, according to a folk biology or folk taxonomy, is remark-
ably uniform across the world (Atran 1998), speaking to the species-wide nature of
this distinction. Taken together, these facts suggest that the animate–inanimate dis-
tinction is profound and fundamental to our conceptualization of the world, and
they are consistent with a view that this distinction, or the basis for it, is innate.
Second, there is evidence that the ability to discriminate animates from inan-
imates and to attribute agency only to animates is found across species, not only
among primates but also distantly related species such as dogs and birds (Hare
et al. 2000, Flombaum & Santos 2005, Carey 2009), suggesting a shared trait with
our common ancestors. Here I depart from Lenneberg’s focus on species-specific
traits as evidence for biological sources of abilities or behaviors. However, using
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cross-species evidence for the ability to distinguish animates from inanimates as a
rationale for its biological roots is not at odds with Lenneberg’s overarching thesis;
rather, if we view an innate ability to distinguish animates from inanimates as exter-
nal to language, but used in the service of decoding grammar by individuals who
have language (i.e. humans), this should not run counter to any of Lenneberg’s argu-
ments. Indeed, he noted that “No biological phenomenon is without antecedents,”
(Lenneberg 1967: 234). Surely, a great many physiological and cognitive traits are
shared with our ancestors, encoded in our genetic makeup, and a shared ability
to distinguish animates from inanimates could be one of these. It seems reason-
able to acknowledge that this ability is likely outside of language and merely used
within the process of acquiring language, as many other cognitive, motoric and
perceptual abilities are. In the case of the constructions discussed here this concep-
tual distinction, in combination with inductive biases about grammatical structure
and syntax–semantics mappings, provides language learners with a crucial means
of achieving what no other communication system permits and is one of the hall-
marks of human language: computation of non-local semantic dependencies.
4. Conclusion
In this brief article I extended some of Lenneberg’s claims about the biological
basis for language by exploring the acquisition of some syntactic constructions
that epitomize the transformational nature of syntax, namely raising and tough-
constructions. The primary claim is that in order to acquire the structure of these
types of sentences children must rely on biases specific to language as well as an
innate (but not necessarily specific to language) ability to distinguish animate from
inanimate entities and to associate animates with (some degree of) agency. The
biases specific to language include the expectation that subjects will tend to be
animate and/or agentive (as in Semantic Bootstrapping), that argument structure
frames are projected locally prior to any syntactic displacements and that these
frames restrict the lexical meanings of predicates (as in Syntactic Bootstrapping),
and that deviations from the canonical alignment of semantic properties with syn-
tactic roles and categories within a sentence provides a clue to learners that seman-
tic relations may need to be computed non-locally.
References
Anderson, Deborah. 2005. The Acquisition of tough Movement in English. Doctoral
Dissertation, University of Cambridge.
Atran, Scott. 1998. Folk biology and the anthropology of science. Behavioral & Brain
Sciences 21, 597–611.
Becker, Misha. 2005. Learning verbs without arguments: The problem of raising
verbs. Journal of Psycholinguistic Research 34, 165–191.
Becker, Misha. 2006. There began to be a learnability puzzle. Linguistic Inquiry 37,
441–456.
Becker, Misha. 2009. The role of animacy and expletives in verb learning. Language
Acquisition 16, 283–296.
390 Biolinguistics F Briefs F
Becker, Misha. 2014. The Acquisition of Syntactic Structure: Animacy and Thematic
Alignment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Becker, Misha. 2015. Animacy and the acquisition of tough-adjectives. Language
Acquisition 22, 68–103. doi:10.1080/10489223.2014.928298.
Becker, Misha, & Bruno Estigarribia. 2013. Harder words: How children learn ab-
stract verbs with opaque syntax. Language Learning and Development 9, 211–
244. doi:10.1080/15475441.2013.753798.
Becker, Misha, & Jeannette Schaeffer. 2013. Animacy, argument structure and un-
accusatives. In Generative Linguistics and Acquisition: Studies in Honor of Nina
M. Hyams, ed. Misha Becker, John Grinstead, & Jason Rothman, 13–33. Ams-
terdam: John Benjamins.
Bunger, Anne, & Jeffrey Lidz. 2008. Thematic relations as a cue to verb class: 2-
year-olds distinguish unaccusatives from unergatives. In Proceedings of the
31st Penn Linguistics Colloquium. Philadelphia: Penn Working Papers in Lin-
guistics.
Carey, Susan. 1985. Conceptual Change in Childhood. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Carey, Susan. 2009. The Origin of Concepts. New York: Oxford University Press.
Chomsky, Carol. 1969. The Acquisition of Syntax in Children from 5 to 10. Research
Monograph 57. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Chomsky, Noam. 1964. Current Issues in Linguistic Theory. The Hague: Mouton.
Chomsky, Noam. 1977. On wh-movement. In Formal Syntax, ed. Peter Culicover,
Thomas Wasow, and Adrian Akmajian. New York: Academic Press.
Chung, Sandra. 1983. ECP and government in Chamorro. Natural Language &
Linguistic Theory 1, 207–244.
Clark, Herbert H., & Jeffrey S. Begun. 1971. The semantics of sentence subjects.
Language & Speech 14, 34–46.
Comrie, Bernard. 1989. Language Universals and Linguistic Typology. Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press.
Corrigan, Roberta. 1988. Children’s identification of actors and patients in proto-
typical and nonprototypical sentence types. Cognitive Development 3, 285–297.
Cromer, Richard. 1970. “Children are nice to understand”: Surface structure clues
for the recovery of deep structure. British Journal of Psychology 61, 395–408.
Dahl, O¨sten, & Kari Fraurud. 1996. Animacy in grammar and discourse. In Referent
and Feferent Accessibility, ed. Thorstein Fretheim & Jeanette K. Gundel, 47–64.
Amsterdam: Benjamins.
Dixon, R.M.W. 1979. Ergativity. Language 55, 59–138.
Farah, Martha. 1995. Dissociable systems for visual recognition: A cognitive neu-
ropsychology approach. In An Invitation to Cognitive Science, vol. 2: Visual cog-
nition, ed. Stephen M. Kosslyn & Daniel N. Osherson, 101–119. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press.
Flombaum, Jonathan, & Laurie Santos. 2005. Rhesus monkeys attribute perceptions
to others. Current Biology 15, 447–452.
Folli, Raffaella, & Heidi Harley. 2008. Teleology and animacy in external arguments.
Lingua 118, 190–202.
Frankland, Steven M., & Joshua D. Greene. 2015. An architecture for encoding sen-
tence meaning in left mid-superior temporal cortex. Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 112, 11732–11737.
Biolinguistics F Briefs F 391
Givo´n, Talmy. 1976. Topic, pronoun, and grammatical agreement. In Subject and
Topic, ed. Charles Li, 267–280. New York: Academic Press.
Gleitman, Lila. 1990. The structural sources of verb meanings. Language Acquisition
1, 3–55.
Gleitman, Lila, Kimberly Cassidy, Rebecca Nappa, Anna Papafragou, & John C.
Trueswell. 2005. Hard words. Language Learning & Development 1, 23–64.
Grimshaw, Jane. 1981. Form, function, and the language acquisition device. In The
Logical Problem of Language Acquisition, ed. C.L. Baker & J.J. McCarthy, 165–
182. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Hare, Brian, Josep Call, Bryan Agnetta, & Michael Tomasello. 2000. Chimpanzees
know what conspecifics do and do not see. Animal Behaviour 59, 771–786.
Hicks, Glyn. 2009. Tough-constructions and their derivation. Linguistic Inquiry 40,
535–566.
Hirsch, Christopher, & Kenneth Wexler. 2007. The late development of raising:
What children seem to think about seem. In New Horizons in the Analysis of
Control and Raising, ed. William D. Davies & Stanley Dubinsky, 35–70. Dor-
drecht: Springer.
Jackendoff, Ray. 1972. Semantic Interpretation in Generative Grammar. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press.
Johnson, Mark H., Suzanne Dziurawiec, Hadyn Ellis, & John Morton. 1991. New-
borns’ prefential tracking of face-like stimuli and its subsequent decline. Cog-
nition 40, 1–19.
Keenan, Edward. 1976. Toward a universal definition of “subject”. In Subject and
Topic, ed. Charles Li, 303–334. New York: Academic Press.
Keil, Frank C. 1989. Concepts, Kinds and Cognitive Development. Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press.
Landau, Barbara, & Lila R. Gleitman. 1985. Language and Experience: Evidence from
the Blind Child. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Lasnik, Howard, & Juan Uriagereka. 1994. A Course in GB Syntax. Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press.
Lee, Joanne N., & Letitia R. Naigles. 2008. Mandarin learners use syntactic boot-
strapping in verb acquisition. Cognition 106, 1028–1037.
Lees, Robert B. 1960. A multiply ambiguous adjectival construction in English.
Language 36, 207–221.
Lempert, Henrietta. 1989. Animacy constraints on preschool children’s acquisition
of syntax. Child Development 60, 237–245.
Lenneberg, Eric H. 1967. Biological Foundations of Language. New York: John Wiley
& Sons.
Li, Charles, & Sandra Thompson. 1976. Subject and topic: A new typology of lan-
guage. In Subject and Topic, ed. Charles Li. New York: Academic Press.
Mak, Willem M., Wietske Vonk, & Herbert Schriefers. 2002. The influence of ani-
macy on relative clause processing. Journal of Memory & Language 47, 50–68.
Massey, Christine, & Rochel Gelman. 1988. Preschooler’s ability to decide whether
a photographed unfamiliar object can move itself. Developmental Psychology
24, 307–317.
392 Biolinguistics F Briefs F
Mitchener, Garrett, & Misha Becker. 2011. A computational model of learning the
raising-control distinction. Research on Language & Computation 8, 169–207.
doi:10/1007/s11168-011-9073-6.
Orfitelli, Robyn. 2012. Argument intervention in the acquisition of A-movement.
Doctoral Dissertation, UCLA.
Perlmutter, David M. 1978. Impersonal passives and the unaccusative hypothesis.
In Proceedings of the Berkeley Linguistic Society 4, 157–189. Berkeley.
Piattelli-Palmarini, Massimo. 2017 [= this issue]. From zero to fifty: Considerations
on Eric Lenneberg’s Biological Foundations of Language and updates. Biolin-
guistics.
Pinker, Steven. 1982. A theory of the acquisition of lexical interpretive grammars.
In The Mental Representation of Grammatical Relations, ed. Joan Bresnan. Cam-
bridge, MA: MIT Press.
Poulin-Dubois, Diane, Anouk Lepage, & Doreen Ferland. 1996. Infants’ concept of
animacy. Cognitive Development 11, 19–36.
Rakison, David H., & Diane Poulin-Dubois. 2001. Developmental origin of the
animate–inanimate distinction. Psychological Bulletin 127, 209–228.
Schachter, Paul. 1976. The subject in Philippine languages: Topic, actor, actor-topic,
or none of the above? In Subject and Topic, ed. Charles Li, 491–518. New York:
Academic Press.
Scott, Rose M., & Cynthia Fisher. 2009. Two-year-olds use distributional cues to in-
terpret transitivity-alternating verbs. Language & Cognitive Processes 24, 777–
803.
Silverstein, M. 1976. Hierarchy of features and ergativity. In Grammatical Categories
in Australian Languages, ed. R.M.W. Dixon. Canberra: Australian Institute for
Aboriginal Studies.
Spelke, Elizabeth. 1991. Physical knowledge in infancy: Reflections on Piaget’s the-
ory. In The Epigenesis of Mind: Essays on Biology and Cognition, ed. Susan Carey
& Rochel Gelman, 133–170. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Traxler, Matthew J., Rihana S. Williams, Shelley A. Blozis, & Robin K. Morris.
2005. Working memory, animacy, and verb class in the processing of rela-
tive clauses. Journal of Memory & Language 53, 204–224.
Trueswell, John C., & Michael K. Tanenhaus. 1994. Toward a lexicalist framework
for constraint-based syntactic ambiguity resolution. In Perspectives on Sen-
tence Processing, ed. C. Clifton, L. Frazier, & K. Rayner, 155–179. Mahwah, NJ:
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Warrington, Elizabeth K., & T. Shallice. 1984. Category specific semantic impair-
ments. Brain 107, 829–853.
Woodward, Amanda. 1998. Infants selectively encode the goal object of an actor’s
reach. Cognition 69, 1–34.
Woodward, Amanda, Ann Phillips, & Elizabeth Spelke. 1993. Infants’ expectations
about the motion of animate versus inanimate objects. In Proceedings of the Fif-
teenth Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, Boulder, CO, 1087–1091.
Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Biolinguistics F Briefs F 393
Misha K. Becker
University of North Carolina
Department of Linguistics
301 Smith Building, CB#3155
Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3155
United States of America
mbecker@email.unc.edu
